Curriculum

This interactive session, led by Sonya Finley (National War College), introduces foundational analytical concepts and frameworks informing the art of national security strategy development. Participants will gain an understanding of America’s evolving conceptualization of national security, grand strategy, and the critical dynamics of public-private collaborative leadership within our national security enterprise. The session will specifically address technological and social changes that have propelled such changes over time.

The major schools of thought in International Relations—Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism—offer valuable insights into the dynamics of national interest, power, security, alliance formation and foreign policy formulation. In navigating the complexities of modern warfare, coup attempts, and terrorism, how should policymakers and scholars acknowledge the interplay of power, norms, and ideas in shaping international outcomes? This session will be led by Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi.

Hackers, Hacktivists, White Hats, and Black Hats—led by Dr. Nina Kollars, this Module will introduce participants to the world of hackers and the ways in which they make and break security. From Russian and Ukrainian hacker armies, to the yearly hacking conventions where new research is revealed, this community of practice is now a cornerstone of how countries leverage their power in cyberspace. This module will be presented by Nina Kollars, U.S. Naval War College

This session will be presented by Dr. Michael Moats.

As our critical infrastructure becomes increasingly interconnected with the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), which plays a vital role in our critical infrastructure, it creates new opportunities for cybercriminals and state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors. The vast number of Internet-connected IIoT devices, such as those monitoring and controlling pipelines, turbines, smart grids, smart transport systems, and more, results in a large and complex attack surface that requires continuous monitoring and protection. It is imperative to swiftly detect and address any incidents with minimal service disruption. However, since 90% of IIoT vulnerabilities do not increase organizational risk, identifying and focusing on the 10% of vulnerabilities that render our critical infrastructure vulnerable is critical. This presentation will explore why conventional cybersecurity defense mechanisms such as patching, and password management are ineffective in safeguarding IIoT systems and why cyber threat hunting is the most effective detection and deterrence strategy. It will also showcase several cutting-edge threat hunting systems developed by the speaker and his team to tackle this challenge, along with suggesting future research directions in this field. This topic will be presented by Dr. Ali Dehghantanha.

As an applied discipline, biosecurity is traditionally aimed at preventing the theft, loss, release, or diversion of biological materials, and related information, of consequence. Most commonly, but not exclusively, biosecurity plans and practices are developed by and for laboratory programs. Health security, however, takes the view that individual, public, and global health are assets that also require protection. When health security is threatened by biological agents or events, the result is a unique interface between health and biosecurity. Incidents before, during, and since the COVID-19 pandemic have brought a greater focus onto this interface, with greater realization of the risk and threat landscape. Today, we recognize the intrinsic security value of our collective health, but we are only beginning to recognize the role that biosecurity programs play in protecting our health asset. This talk will explore the interface between health and biosecurity, and tie that to biodefense initiatives. Further, this presentation will highlight examples of disruptions to the interface between health and biosecurity. This session will be presented by Dr. Ryan Burnett

Why did Vladimir Putin decide to invade Ukraine? This talk focuses on the mentality of Putin and his close associates that informed the decision for war. To understand decision-making in a personalist dictatorship, it is important to study the personality of the dictator. This topic will be presented by Dr. Brian Taylor.

The 1990s was marked by a surge of global economic activity, fueled by liberalization policies and free trade agreements to ease the movement of people, conveyances, and goods across national borders. This led to a dramatic expansion in the variety, volume and velocity of goods circulating around the world and a rapid growth of the cargo and transportation networks that facilitated that growth. Intermodal logistics were revolutionized, dramatically lowering the cost of operating complex global supply chains. Increasingly companies realized that they could dispense with the expense of maintaining large inventories in warehouses or in the backrooms of department stores. They instead relied on “just-in-time shipping” where the transportation system effectively served as a mobile warehouse. One outcome of the speed with which the global supply system has evolved over the past three decades, has been that security measures within the maritime and surface transportation sectors have not been keeping pace allowing transportation systems to be exploited for smuggling of an array of contraband, weapons, and dangerous materials.  More soberingly, the global supply system can also be potentially targeted by malicious actors who recognize both its vulnerability and consequence of disruption an infrastructure critical to the economic life of the nation and global community, highlighted most recently by the attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted how dependent modern economic life is on the efficient cross-border flow of supply chains, elevating the importance of strengthening the safeguards that assure the continuity of the global supply system.  In this session, Flynn will outline the sources of supply chain vulnerabilities along with the associated national security stakes, and what can and should be done to enhance global supply system security and resilience.

For almost 80 years, nuclear weapons have both deterred and created existential threats to the United States and its allies. They became less prominent with the end of the Cold War, but this trend is now reversing as the U.S.-Chinese and U.S. Russian rivalries grow more intense and as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal matures. These same developments are also leading various non-nuclear-weapon states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. At the same time, technological developments are increasing the danger of both a nuclear deterrence failure and of further proliferation.

Space assets have become critical to our way of life, underpinning significant economic and military activities. However, these spacecraft are vulnerable to a range of threats, both unintentional and purposeful. This presentation will examine international space security issues at the nexus of civil, military, and commercial activities, including current challenges and debates related to space debris, space situational awareness, space traffic management, anti-satellite weapons, and the potential for conflict in space. This topic will be presented by Dr. Mariel Borowitz.

Coming soon.

In July 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt met at Pearl Harbor with General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, the two most important American commanders in the Pacific Theater. MacArthur argued for an invasion of the Philippines, Nimitz for an invasion of Formosa (present day Taiwan). Roosevelt had to make the difficult choice between these two major operations. Ultimately, he opted for the Philippines, in part because the prospect of invading Formosa promised to be so bloody and challenging. Eighty years later, the island remains a formidable objective for a prospective invader. In that sense, Roosevelt’s hard choices provide us with many useful lessons that still resonate today. This session is led by John McManus.

Led by Alanna Krolikowski, this session explores China’s rise to a leading global innovator of cutting-edge commercial and defense technologies and its implications for international security. We survey the Chinese innovation ecosystem, government strategies for sectors spanning semiconductors to artificial intelligence, and the country’s ambitious military modernization.

Key Topics:

• Key features of climate and ecological issues as security and political problems
• An overview and framework of key climate- and ecological risks
• The state of US and international policymaking, and open questions

The governments of both the United States and some of its strategic competitors have acknowledged that quantum computing has the potential to significantly affect national security by enabling new capabilities in scientific simulation, logistics, and – most famously – fast decryption of secure communications. This course will provide an overview of the status of quantum computing and its potential impacts on national security, without assuming any background in that topic. It will address questions including: what is a quantum computer? What will it eventually be used for? What are the realistic timelines for useful deployment? How is the U.S. government postured to address the threats and opportunities posed by quantum computing? How does U.S. progress in quantum computing technology development compare to that of strategic competitor nations such as China? What are some of the biggest questions facing today’s policy makers? There will be plenty of time for open discussion.

This simulation will be led by Dr. ED McGrady

In considering new and emerging technologies there are two general areas of concern in terms of national security: peer conflict and information operations. Advances in communications, computation and materials have allowed hypersonic missiles, networked weapons system, increased capacity and persistence of intelligence, search, and reconnaissance (ISR), and other enhancements to conventional military operations. At the same time our dependence on interconnected electronic devices has made civil infrastructure, and even civil community, exposed in ways that it has not been in past conflicts.

If we combine these two areas of concern, we find ourselves trying to deal with sophisticated adversaries who have these gray area capabilities that can do considerable damage both practically and socially, but that don’t look like “real” attacks. In addition, these “informationalized” capabilities (as the Chinese would refer to them) are not limited to nation states, can be confusing to attribute, and can do damage without even being noticed. They can also scale to affect large numbers of targets with minimal additional investment. When combined with novel weapons such as drones and terror tactics, we may find ourselves in a highly disruptive environment, with few tools for deterrence or response.

One area that has become an increasing concern is the vulnerability of democratic processes and cultures to advanced information technologies. To date we have seen dispersed and uncoordinated attacks on various elements of democratic processes, from mis- and dis-information to attacks on the credibility of the election system. However, the threat exists to develop a coordinated, multi-model, attack on various aspects of the election system, from information to voters to the apparatus of the election itself. These attacks could have serious national security impacts. They may be network attacks, cognitive attacks

In the game we explore a technology-enabled internal and external threat to US national election integrity. The triumvirate of bad actors, Russia, China, and Iran seek to disrupt or discredit an upcoming election and sow division within the country. The US government must defend against or deter these threats. This is made all the more complicated by dedicated partisans on both side who may be supported by a threat actor. The threats can attack through information, manipulation, cognitive hacks, or direct, kinetic, attacks.

The game will last 6 hours. Players will represent either US policy makers, or threat actors attempting to disrupt or distract the US in a Presidential election year. The threat actors will have their own agendas and may or may not be working toward the same goal. The game starts a year before the election, and moves through the months prior to the election, and into the aftermath. Players will need to decide on policies, allocate resources, and work both the prevention and response problems.

The threat will not be the usual array of overly enthusiastic but under prepared group of criminals and bad actors. Instead, the threat, enabled by nation states, will have the ability to use advanced technologies in novel ways to disrupt US systems and operations. At the same time, they will also need to be aware of any signatures they are spreading, lest law enforcement become aware of them and begin rolling them up.

The game will challenge the threat players to think about the US as a system and use their tools to disrupt that system. The US players will need to respond by creating a policy, and a response, environment where those challenges can be met while under realistic constraints. And, ultimately, protect the credibility of the election system so the voters can decide.